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DEPOLITICIZING FEDERALISM
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN*

In his great biography of President Andrew Jackson,1 Ar‐
thur Schlesinger, Jr. celebrated Jackson’s defense of the rights
of states and opposition to federal power. Yet as a mid‐
twentieth‐century liberal, Schlesinger was a strong supporter
of the federal government and an opponent of states’ rights.2
Was Schlesinger’s position inconsistent? He did not think so,3
and neither do I. In Jackson’s time, an entrenched economic
elite controlled the federal government and used federal
power to dominate the lower classes.4 State governments
served as a focal point for opposition to this domination. By
mid‐twentieth century, the federal government was an engine
for redistribution and racial justice.5 States’ rights rhetoric
served the interests of segregationists and reactionaries.6
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University
Law Center. I am grateful to Sara Sampson for her timely and invaluable research
assistance. These remarks were originally delivered at the Thirtieth Annual Na‐
tional Federalist Society Student Symposium held at the University of Virginia
School of Law. I have edited them slightly and added some footnotes but retained
their informal character.
1. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF JACKSON (1945).
2. See Douglas Martin, Arthur Schlesinger, Historian of Power, Dies at 89, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 2007, at A1 (calling Schlesinger an “unabashedly liberal partisan . . . “).
3. Schlesinger put the point this way:
It is always a question of whose ox is gored. . . . The crucial question is not, Is
there ‘too much’ government? but, Does the government promote ‘too much’
the interests of a single group? In liberal capitalist society this question has
ordinarily become in practice, Is the government serving the interests of the
business community to the detriment of the nation as a whole?
SCHLESINGER, supra note 1, at 514.
4. Cf. Mark Fenster, Seeing the State: Transparency as a Metaphor, 62 ADMIN. L.
REV. 617, 632 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Wagner Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74‐198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)); Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88‐38,
77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006)); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L.
No. 88‐352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C. ch. 21 (2006)).
6. See, e.g., MARTIN GARBUS, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
UNMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 124 (2002); PATRICK M. GARRY, AN ENTRENCHED
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Schlesinger’s example poses an important challenge for those
who want to generalize and depoliticize the argument about fed‐
eral versus state power. The argument about federalism is, or at
least should be, deeply contextual, and it is political to the core. In
different times and places, federalism has differing relationships
with substantive justice,7 and, in all times and all places, people
disagree about what counts as substantive justice. What we
should be doing, therefore, is talking about our disagreements
about substantive justice—about the appropriate role of markets
and government, about redistribution and property rights, and
about our obligations to the poor and individual freedom—
instead of changing the subject to talk about federalism.
There are several ways in which legal scholars have at‐
tempted to depoliticize federalism. One way is to treat it as a
question of constitutional law. On this view, instead of debat‐
ing what policies our government should adopt, we should ar‐
gue about what James Madison and his contemporaries
thought or about what the words he and others wrote two cen‐
turies ago meant.8
LEGACY: HOW THE NEW DEAL CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION CONTINUES TO
SHAPE THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 94 (2008). Almost half a century after
publication of The Age of Jackson, Schlesinger was ready to concede that some of
his conclusions about Jackson were, themselves, grounded in the political context
in which he had worked. Yet he continued to argue that Jackson’s own stance on
federal power appropriately depended on political context. See Arthur
Schlesinger Jr., The Ages of Jackson, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Dec. 7, 1989,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1989/dec/07/the‐ages‐of‐jackson/ (“In
practice, the answer to the question of the proper role of the state depended for
the Jacksonians on the answer to the question who controlled the state; and this
is what the fight in the age of Jackson was all about.”).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 161 (1975) (federalism and protection of fugitive slaves); MICHAEL J.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 391 (2004) (discussing federalism and desegrega‐
tion); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Feder‐
alism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 998–1007 (2002) (discussing federal‐
ism and gender equality).
8. For examples of this approach, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585–
93 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 163–
167 (1992). It must be noted, however, that even the Court’s leading originalists
have strayed from this approach and adopted something like a “living constitu‐
tion” analysis when it suited their purposes. For example, in his opinion for the
Court in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) Justice Scalia acknowledged
that there was nothing in the constitutional text prohibiting the putative in‐
fringement on state power before the Court. Id. at 905 (“[T]here is no constitu‐
tional text speaking to this precise question . . . .”). One would have thought that
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This approach to federalism has played an important role in
the history—not to say the name—of the Federalist Society,9 but
I am glad to see that the organizers and participants in this event
seem to be moving away from it. The effort to think through the
political economy of federalism—the subject matter of this
panel—amounts to an implicit acknowledgment that the appro‐
priate division of authority between the federal government and
the States cannot, and should not, be read off a constitutional
text written by deeply flawed authors during a deeply flawed
process designed to deal with a country unrecognizably differ‐
ent from the one we live in today. The decision to talk about fed‐
eralism in terms of political economy must be grounded in a
concession that the Constitution does not resolve the issue.
This acknowledgement, belated as it is, should nonetheless
be welcomed. Perhaps, in the fullness of time, it will lead to the
acknowledgement of another obvious fact: All sides regularly
use the rhetoric of federalism to advance contestable political
positions.10 I have made a standing offer to several of my col‐
leagues to take them out to lunch if they can point to a single
person living in the United States who favors the Patient Pro‐
tection and Affordable Care Act11 as a matter of policy but
nonetheless regretfully concludes that it is unconstitutional.
There are over 300 million women, men, and children from
whom to choose,12 but, as this Article goes to press, my col‐
for an originalist this would be the end of the matter. Undaunted, Justice Scalia
went on to invalidate the challenged federal statute because it violated “historical
understanding, and practice, the structure of the Constitution, and the jurispru‐
dence of this Court.” Id.; see also Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1950 (2011) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (“There comes before us, now and then, a case whose proper out‐
come is so clearly indicated by tradition and common sense, that its decision
ought to shape the law, rather than vice versa.”); Robert Post & Reva Siegel,
Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 545, 559 (2006) (discussing an originalist’s argument that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not protect against sex discrimination).
9. For a discussion of originalism’s influence on the Federalist Society, see gen‐
erally ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER‐CENTURY OF DEBATE (Steven G. Calabresi ed.,
2007). The first Federalist Society event was a symposium on federalism held at
the Yale Law School in April 1982. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSER‐
VATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 138 (2008).
10. For those requiring proof of obvious facts, see, for example, Post & Siegel,
supra note 8, at 562; Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Instrumentalism, and the Legacy of the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 906, 906–07 (2006).
11. Pub. L. No. 111‐148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
12. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 9 (2011),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/11statab/pop.pdf.
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leagues have yet to identify one who meets these criteria. I am
happy to extend the offer to the first reader of this Journal who
comes up with such a person.13
The retreat to constitutional law is not the only way to depo‐
liticize federalism, however. Unfortunately, the choice of sub‐
ject matter for this panel effectively endorses another method.
The assumption underlying that choice seems to be that the
“science” of political economy provides an uncontroversial,
apolitical, technocratic solution to questions about centraliza‐
tion of power. Once one understands some basic truths about
things like exit options, prisoner’s dilemmas, and races to the
top or the bottom, then all people of good will—in all times
and places, whatever their differences concerning substantive
justice—can agree on the appropriate level of government to
resolve various disputes.
This effort, too, is bound to fail. To see why, we might focus
on two highly simplified sets of narratives about the interrela‐
tionship between freedom and federalism. Friends of federalism
adopt the narrative of decentralized diversity. For them, the
story goes as follows: Decentralization promotes freedom be‐
cause it satisfies a greater variety of preferences. Instead of being
trapped in large units of government, individuals can choose
between different, smaller units that offer a menu of regulatory
options. Therefore, federalism promotes freedom.14 This narra‐
tive often is supplemented with the closely related narrative of
experimentation, complete with the mandatory citation to Justice
Brandeis’s celebration of states as “laboratories.”15
These arguments, sometimes presented with great sophistica‐
tion and careful elaboration, have provided powerful support
for federalism.16 Unfortunately, however, they are countered by
an equally powerful set of narratives. The primary story here is
13. I will choose the location, date, and time. I assume here with a high degree
of confidence that a lunch with me is not sufficiently attractive to motivate people
to make claims in bad faith.
14. See, e.g., Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, 64 J. POL.
ECON. 416, 416–19 (1956); Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Foun‐
ders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493 (1987) (book review).
15. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent‐
ing) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single coura‐
geous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
16. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 14.

No. 1]

Depoliticizing Federalism

125

the prisoner’s dilemma.17 On this version of the way things are,
the citizens of individual states want to develop a particular
regulatory regime, but competition between states prevents
them from doing so. For example, imagine that the citizens of
both Virginia and Maryland want to adopt a minimum wage.
Each state knows that if it does so by itself, however, all the em‐
ployers will move to the other state. The freedom of these citi‐
zens is therefore diminished rather than enhanced by the exit
threat. The freedom of both states can be maximized if both
commit to acting in concert—something that they can do
through the mechanism of federal legislation.18

17. For a concise explanation of prisoner’s dilemma games as well as an argu‐
ment that scholars often mistake coordination problems for prisoner’s dilemma
problems, see generally Richard H. McAdams, Beyond Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordi‐
nation, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009).
18. This theory played a crucial role in the Supreme Court’s decision upholding
the federal unemployment compensation system in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937). Writing for the Court, Justice Cardozo claimed that opponents
of the system attacked it as an effort “to drive the state legislatures under the
whip of economic pressure into the enactment of unemployment compensation
laws at the bidding of the central government.” Id. at 587. But Cardozo saw mat‐
ters differently:
Before Congress acted, unemployment compensation insurance was still,
for the most part, a project and no more. . . . But if states had been
holding back before the passage of the federal law, inaction was not
owing, for the most part, to the lack of sympathetic interest. Many held
back through alarm lest, in laying such a toll upon their industries, they
would place themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as
compared with neighbors and competitors. . . . [T]he freedom of a state to
contribute its fair share to the solution of a national problem was
paralyzed by fear.
Id. at 587–88.
For a scholarly elaboration of the point in the context of environmental law, see
Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1197 (1977).
Some scholars have argued that competition among states actually produces a
race to the top. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995). Others have claimed that interstate
competition might reduce the level of regulation but produce the optimal amount
of it. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking
the “Race‐to‐the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1210 (1992). Of course, if one equates optimality with the outcome of compe‐
tition, this claim is tautological. But much of our politics is dominated by dis‐
agreement over just that equation. For an exploration of market defects that might
lead to suboptimal outcomes in competitions between states, see Peter P. Swire,
The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition
Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 68 (1996).
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Just as the narrative of experimentation supplements the de‐
centralized diversity narrative, so too the narrative of external‐
ized costs supplements the prisoner’s dilemma narrative. This
narrative is most intuitively accessible when states facially dis‐
criminate against nonresidents.19 Nonresidents then dispropor‐
tionately bear the costs of government action without getting
the benefits. But the externalities idea is not so easily cabined.20
Suppose, for example, that the citizens of Alaska decide to turn
the entire Alaska wilderness into a parking lot. Even if that de‐
cision accurately reflects their own preferences, it imposes costs
on those of us who do not vote in Alaska elections. When Mis‐
sissippi decided to serve as a laboratory for an “experiment” in
a pervasive system of racial subjugation, the harms it inflicted
were not just on its own African American citizens, but also on
all the rest of us who did not want to live in a country where
this sort of injustice occurred.
Both of these sets of narratives are, in some sense, true, and
both are available to people who favor action on the federal or
state level. The important point for present purposes, however,
is that the choice between narratives strongly correlates with
the choice between different conceptions of freedom. For peo‐
ple who conceptualize freedom primarily as private choice in a
private sphere, the first set of narratives will be attractive. The
inability of states to coordinate and prevent exit restrains the
government regulation that they fear. For people who concep‐
tualize freedom as collective choice that controls oppressive,
private power, the second set of narratives is more appealing.
The greater ability of the federal government to coordinate
promotes the government regulation that they favor.
This is not to say that the correlation is perfect. Suppose that
both Virginia and Maryland want to deregulate the use of nar‐
cotics. Here, the prisoner’s dilemma narrative might be ad‐
vanced to serve libertarian ends. Perhaps states are constrained
by the fear that if either acts on its own, it will be inundated by
19. See, e.g., S.C. State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2
(1938) (“State regulations affecting interstate commerce, whose purpose or effect
is to gain for those within the state an advantage at the expense of those without,
or to burden those out of the state without any corresponding advantage to those
within, have been thought to impinge upon the [Commerce Clause] even though
Congress has not acted.”).
20. For the classic elaboration of this point, see Duncan Kennedy, Cost‐Benefit
Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 398–401 (1981).

No. 1]

Depoliticizing Federalism

127

drug users. Deregulation on the federal level might avoid this
difficulty. Conversely, suppose that a strong majority of Cali‐
fornians wants to regulate greenhouse emissions, but a national
majority rejects regulation. Here, the narrative of decentralized
diversity might promote regulation. Indeed, Justice Brandeis’s
original example of states acting as laboratories involved state
regulation of matters left unregulated on the federal level.21
It is precisely because the correlation is not perfect that some‐
times political actors appear to be behaving in an unprincipled
fashion by favoring federal or state power on a result‐oriented
basis. When the correlation fails, actors who consistently favor
a particular conception of freedom will necessarily have an in‐
consistent position about federalism. Often, these people are
called “unprincipled.”22 If my thesis is correct, however, they
are not unprincipled at all. Instead, they are motivated by the
principles that should matter the most to us—by their deeply
and sincerely held beliefs about the nature of human flourish‐
ing and the primary threats to that flourishing.
Many may find it unsettling that we disagree so starkly and
fundamentally about these basic questions. Like members of a
dysfunctional family desperate to stay together but forever tee‐
tering on the edge of uncontrolled anger and irreparable rup‐
ture, we want to change the subject. But fearful secrets and for‐
bidden topics must be confronted sooner or later. Conflict
cannot be wished away by ignoring it, and we cannot forever
fool our opponents into thinking that some uncontroversial
premise forces them to do things our way. The sooner we start
talking to each other honestly about what really matters, the
better it will be for all of us.

21. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 263 (1932).
22. E.g., Christopher A. Bracey, Louis Brandeis and the Race Question, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 859, 907 (2001).

